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While this willingness of the court to listen to the State Department's views has considerable
merit, the somewhat haphazard process for issuing these statements of interest means that
results in individual cases are uncertain.
As a closing example of how far changes have come in the past 20 years or so in the
immunity area-i.e., more immunity and more confusion-consider the seminal Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.10 The defendant, Pena, was the inspector
general of police in Asuncion, Paraguay, when he allegedly kidnapped and tortured Filartiga
in Paraguay in 1976. In the successful ATS suit brought by Filartiga's family against Pena,
the Second Circuit did not discuss whether Pena, a government official at the time of the
torture, was protected under the then-new FSIA.
Former police official Pena might be immune under the FSIA today, though there would
be a question of whether the torturing and death were within the scope of his authority and
whether the FSIA applies to former government officials. However, if the FSIA applies,
then the holding in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess"1 makes it clear that the FSIA
would be the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction over Pena, not the ATS.
1 2
Given this complexity and lack of clarity, it might be useful to recall the immunity situation
in the 1970s for foreign states. After the Tate letter of 1952, the U.S. State Department had
been making decisions on immunity for foreign states, which the U.S. courts accepted. For
various reasons, the practice was inconsistent, and the State Department was uncomfortable
with its role. So, in 1976, with the State Department's encouragement, Congress passed the
FSIA, which was designed to provide objective standards to be interpreted by the courts on
whether or not a foreign state should be granted immunity.
Now, thirty years later, questions arise about the scope of the FSIA regarding the immunity
of foreign officials, and there is continuing uncertainty about the head-of-state doctrine. It
would seem timely for the academic community, the Executive Branch, and Congress to
analyze these questions further.
First, what should be the appropriate standards for immunity for foreign officials? Part of
this analysis should include careful research into the laws and practices of other countries-
research that has not been done. For consideration of reciprocity and diplomacy, it would
seem wise to know what other countries are doing as the United States moves forward.
Second, on the basis of the analysis recommended above, there should be an effort to
develop a reasonably clear set of statutory standards regarding immunity for foreign officials
who are not diplomats, standards that could amend or supplement the FSIA and might well
override the common law head-of-state doctrine.
ARBITRATING HUMAN RIGHTS
by Roger P. Alford*
Corporate liability is the current rage in human rights litigation. According to the Institute
for Legal Reform, affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, over forty cases are
currently pending against corporations for alleged violations of the Alien Tort Statute or the
10 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
12 The U.S. Supreme Court cited Filitariga with apparent approval in Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2764, but that was
regarding the scope of the law of nations, not the scope of foreign officials' immunity.
* Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.
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Torture Victims Protection Act. This controversial trend toward corporate responsibility may
reflect a genuine concern about malfeasance in aiding and abetting the sovereign abuse of
power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that the principal perpetrators-
sovereign entities-are beyond the reach of most victims. If victims cannot pursue claims
against the principals, they will resign themselves to pursuing claims against those who aid
and abet.
How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the accomplice is pursued while the
principal evades punishment? The answer, of course, is sovereign immunity. With limited
exceptions, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a foreign state is immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
It is curious that no exception to the FSIA has proven successful in holding sovereign
entities responsible for human rights abuses. Decades of litigation have developed one novel
theory after another to fit human rights abuse into the FSIA exceptions. It is as though every
plausible exception of the FSIA has been tried and each found wanting, except one.
If one were to ask which FSIA exception is the most promising to secure sovereign
accountability for gross human rights violations, which exception would one choose? The
commercial activity exception has been tried and repeatedly rejected. An implied waiver for
jus cogens violations has not found favor. Torts within the United States might be a promising
candidate, but most human rights abuses are extraterritorial. The terrorism exception is
confined to a handful of rogue states. Two exceptions pertaining to real property are effective
but quite narrow in scope. And the prospect of a new exception for human rights violations
was raised and rejected in negotiations on the new convention on state immunities. But there
remains one.
Although the least likely candidate for holding sovereign entities accountable for human
rights abuses, the arbitration exception is the one that that may prove most promising. If, as
many believe, corporate liability for human rights abuses is the new game in town, this
initiative should not view corporations as the substitute for governments, but rather as the
vehicle to secure government accountability. Through arbitration, sovereigns consent to be
sued and consent to have arbitral awards enforced in foreign courts.
The arbitration exception provides that sovereigns shall not be immune from jurisdiction
in any case "in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the
foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which ... may arise between the parties ... or to confirm an award made pursuant
to such an agreement to arbitrate, if ... the agreement or award is or may be governed by
... [the New York Convention]."' Thus, this exception has by far the broadest U.S. nexus
requirement of any FSIA exception, embracing within its sweep virtually all foreign conduct
that implicates international arbitration.
In a typical foreign investment agreement, corporations insist in their dealing with sovereign
entities upon a broadly worded arbitration clause providing that any or all disputes arising
out of or relating to the agreement shall be subject to arbitration in a neutral forum. Corpora-
tions also frequently have the bargaining power to require New York or English law as the
governing law, and stipulate that this law shall apply notwithstanding traditional choice of
law rules. Some agreements even go so far as to include an indemnification clause in which
the sovereign holds the foreign investor harmless from any third-party claims.
'28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
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Any arbitration agreement or award is enforceable under the New York Convention in
135 signatory nations. This means that virtually all foreign investment arbitration agreements
and awards are subject to court enforcement, including those involving sovereign entities.
In short, most human rights abuses in the world that relate to a foreign investment agreement
may trigger arbitration between the parties, and any award arising from such arbitration will
be subject to enforcement in any New York Convention country, including the United States.
One might say the mechanism to hold sovereign entities accountable for human rights abuses
is hidden in plain view.
To illustrate how this would work in practice, I will divide the corporate world into three
realms: the "malfeasant" corporations, the "benign" corporation, and the "beneficent"
corporation.
We are familiar with the first variety. These entities are not good corporate citizens, do
not subscribe to codes of conduct, and are willing to aid and abet sovereign human rights
abuses in the name of shareholder value. This small cluster of corporations is the central
focus of the new infatuation for corporate liability. We can anticipate that they will continue
to be subject to litigation in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute.
Without judging the merits of this controversial movement, 2 one can anticipate that any
corporation found liable for aiding and abetting sovereign human rights abuses will have
the opportunity to pursue a claim of contribution against the sovereign joint tortfeasor. For
example, a corporation that is marginally culpable but held joint and severally liable can
reduce its exposure by arbitrating a contribution claim with the sovereign joint-venturer to
pay its proportional share. Recently, a multinational energy corporation has taken precisely
this approach in an indemnity claim against the Ecuador's state-owned company to pay the
alleged $1 billion expense to clean up environmental contamination in the Amazon. 3 Under
this theory, the corporation can invoke arbitration because the question of relative culpability
is a matter that relates to the joint venture agreement. Under governing laws of New York
and England, there are detailed and well recognized rules for claims of contribution by one
joint tortfeasor against the other.4 Any award against the sovereign can be subject to enforce-
ment in virtually any New York Convention country, including the United States. To the
extent the sovereign entity does not have assets in the United States, the corporation can
invoke the guarantee agreement signed by the sovereign to secure enforcement. In short,
plaintiffs who pursue claims in court against a corporate tortfeasor will have opened the
door for the corporation to hold the sovereign tortfeasor accountable in arbitration. The
malfeasant corporation can in effect be used as a vehicle to enforce human rights obligations
against the sovereign.
The second category of corporations encompasses those entities that adhere to traditional
shareholder primacy theories of corporate behavior. These corporations are not indifferent
to human rights abuses, but they discount the role of corporations in advancing social justice
out of fidelity to the policy of maximizing shareholder welfare. For these corporations,
external pressure is often necessary to harness their power as agents for human rights. That
2 For a recent discussion, see In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 2005 WL 729177, (E.D.N.Y.
2005). For references on the topic, see Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On
the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & Soc'y REV. 635, 661-663 (2004).
3 See, <http://www.texaco.comlsiteletsecuador/enlpress-releases/2004-06-15 file-arbitration.asp>; <http://www.global
exchange.org/countries/americas/ecuador/2021 .html>.
4 See Paul F. Kirgis, Apportioning Tort Damages in New York: A Method to the Madness, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
427 (2001) (discussing New York rule); Tony Weir, All or Nothing?, 78 TuL. L. REv. 511 (2004) (discussing
English Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978).
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external power comes in the form of lending and insurance institutions. The International
Finance Corporation of the World Bank has recently issued policy statements (the Equator
Principles) that address concerns such as involuntary resettlement, environmental protection,
child and forced labor, and the rights of indigenous peoples.5 These principles have been
adopted by the IFC and almost thirty major commercial banks representing over 75 percent
of all development project financing, thus becoming the de facto standard for foreign direct
investment. Likewise, corporations seeking political risk insurance from organizations such
as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency are subject to similar environmental and
social policies. 6 These institutions have compliance ombudsmen to ensure that their borrowers
and policyholders abide by their contractual obligations. Thus, lending and insurance institu-
tions impose obligations on corporate borrowers to secure government compliance with
international standards on environmental, human rights, and social policy.
Human rights compliance is increasingly becoming a contractual obligation, and failure
to comply constitutes a breach of the relevant agreements that may trigger arbitration. All
of these agreements-the loan agreement, political risk insurance policy, the sovereign
guarantee agreement, and the joint venture agreement-typically include arbitration as the
standard dispute settlement mechanism, thereby ensuring that the aggrieved parties can
enforce arbitral awards in foreign courts. In short, foreign investment begets human rights
obligations that beget arbitral claims for breach of contract that beget enforceable awards in
foreign courts. Benign corporations thereby become agents for holding sovereign entities
accountable.
The third category of corporations is at the vanguard of the movement for corporate
responsibility. These corporations may be instrumental in the final frontier of human rights
compliance: empowering the victims to pursue claims against sovereigns through enforceable
dispute settlement procedures. This is done through employment agreements and third party
beneficiary rights in investment agreements. Mandatory employment arbitration in the United
States is controversial as a perceived means to transfer employment disputes from effective
public courts into the more private, party-controlled arbitration. But in the international
context where public courts of host countries often offer little hope for the vindication of labor
rights, the prospect of arbitrating employment disputes over labor standards is a promising
alternative. For example, one U.S. nongovernmental organization, Verit6, has partnered with
dozens of multinational corporations to conduct "social audits" of over thirteen hundred
factories in sixty countries to strengthen compliance with international labor standards. 7 Their
recommendations include grievance procedures that incorporate employee arbitration as a
dispute settlement mechanism. 8 Any award brought by an employee for violations of labor
standards would be subject to enforcement under the New York Convention and enforceable
in court. 9 As for those victims who lack contractual privity, one can envision a future in
which third-party beneficiary rights are accorded to arbitrate certain human rights abuses.
Just as bilateral investment treaties empower third-party constituents to arbitrate disputes
against the host country, certain corporations may wish to grant third-party beneficiary rights
in a joint venture agreement to certain constituents to pursue grievances and perhaps even
5 See <www.equator-principles.com>.
6 See <http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/safeguard/background.htm>.
7 See <http://www.verite.org/services/main.html>.
8 See <http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/gc/mp/pdf/nike-verite-report.pdf>.
9 Ian H. Eliasoph, A Missing Link: International Arbitration and the Ability of Private Actors to Enforce Human
Rights Norms, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 83 (2004).
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arbitration. More than an indemnification clause, this approach could remove corporations
from the liability loop and permit victims to directly pursue claims against the sovereign
tortfeasor. 10 Such an approach would authorize nonparties to invoke arbitration against the
sovereign for human rights violations relating to the joint venture. There is precedent for
this in the intellectual property context with the arbitration of third-party beneficiary claims
relating to domain name disputes.1 1 Likewise, third-party beneficiaries can arbitrate privacy
violations in data transfer agreements under European Union data collection law. 12 There is
no legal obstacle to granting similar contractual rights to third parties in the human rights
context. Indeed, some universities have adopted a crude version of this in their license
agreements.13 Another nascent version is employed by the Fair Labor Association, an organi-
zation that has partnered with major corporations and utilizes a third-party complaint proce-
dure to uncover instances of noncompliance with labor standards. 14 In short, employment
agreements and third-party beneficiary rights in international agreements are innovative
means to harness the power of corporations to ensure sovereign accountability for human
rights violations. Beneficent corporations can offer significant benefits to the cause of human
rights through the mundane vehicle of international arbitration.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMMUNITY: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY AND THE
ACCOUNTABILITY OF STATES
by Gerhard Hafner*
To a large extent, accountability of governments is conceived as an obligation imposed
upon states to answer to individuals for injuries inflicted upon individuals. This concept
corresponds to the concept of public accountability of government officials and civil servants
of the United States as understood by Allan Rosenbaum,1 and as developed more than 220
years ago. Viewed from a more general perspective, this concept of accountability entails
two questions: on the one hand, the question of identifying the injuries for which a state may
become answerable to individuals and, on the other, of determining how this accountability of
a state can be assured or invoked by the individuals.
The latter aspect also raises the issue of whether and to what extent individuals can institute
judicial proceedings against states. States are widely protected by their state immunity against
proceedings instituted by individuals before foreign courts. In such cases, individuals depend
on the willingness of their own states to exercise diplomatic protection.
Individuals have two possibilities for ensuring the accountability of a foreign state: either
through international institutions such as human rights courts or the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or through a restriction of immunity.
State immunity is certainly a classical topic of international law, pertaining to the delimita-
tion of power among states. Its objective is the protection of one state against the exercise
10 See James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L. J. 469, 510-529 (2004).
I1 See <http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm>.
12 See <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/e-business/ICC-model clausesFAQs.pdf>.
13 See <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/codes/code.html>.
14 See <http://www.fairlabor.org/all/complaint/index.html>.
* Professor, University of Vienna, Austria.
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